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Abstract—In recent years, as intrusion attacks on IoT networks
have grown exponentially, there is an immediate need for sophis-
ticated intrusion detection systems (IDSs). A vast majority of
current IDSs are data-driven, which means that one of the most
important aspects of this area of research is the quality of the
data acquired from IoT network traffic. Two of the most cited
intrusion detection datasets are the KDDCup99 and the NSL-
KDD. The main goal of our project was to conduct a robust
comparison of both datasets by evaluating the performance of
various Machine Learning (ML) classifiers trained on them with
a larger set of classification metrics than previous researchers.
From our research, we were able to conclude that the NSL-KDD
dataset is of a higher quality than the KDDCup99 dataset as the
classifiers trained on it were on average 20.18% less accurate.
This is because the classifiers trained on the KDDCup99 dataset
exhibited a bias towards the redundancies within it, allowing
them to achieve higher accuracies.
Index Terms—Intrusion Detection, Machine Learning, NSL-
KDD, KDDCup99, Artificial Neural Network, Random Forest,
Support Vector Machine, Naïve Bayes Classifier
I. Introduction
With the rapid development of the internet, intrusion attacks
on IoT networks have been growing exponentially and are a
highly pertinent threat in the modern era. Millions of internet
users, companies, and national governments are liable to
cyberattacks. Consequently, creating sophisticated methods to
identify these network intrusions is one of the most prevalent
problems in cybersecurity research.
Network intrusion detection systems (IDSs) heavily rely on
data from IoT networks to "learn" patterns that allow them
to identify compromised networks. Two prominent datasets
used for network intrusion classification are the KDDCup99
and NSL-KDD. The KDDCup99 dataset was created in 1999
by researchers at the University of California, Irvine and was
the pioneer intrusion detection dataset. However, it has been
empirically shown that the KDDCup99 dataset contains many
inefficiencies. The NSL-KDD dataset, which is a subsample of
the KDDCup99 dataset, was created by the University of New
Brunswick Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity in response to
these flaws.
Throughout this paper, we will refer to two different classifi-
cation subproblems: binary and type classification. The binary
classification refers to identifying whether a network state rep-
resents an intrusion or not (no intrusion / normal = 0, intrusion
= 1). The type classification refers to identifying whether a
network state represents one of five different intrusion types:
Normal (no intrusions), DoS, Probe, R2L, and U2R. These
intrusion types are defined in the "Datasets (IV)" section. In
the past, there have been very few exhaustive comparisons of
both the KDDCup99 and NSL-KDD datasets. As a result, this
study hopes to shed light on the similarities and differences
between these datasets in regards to how various Machine
Learning (ML) classifiers train and perform on them. We used
four ML classifiers for this study: the Naïve Bayes Classifier
(NBC), Support Vector Machines (SVMs), Random Forests,
and Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs).
II. Related Research
Artificial Intelligence (AI) and ML have been readily used
to analyze and classify data in both the KDDCup99 and
NSL-KDD network intrusion detection datasets. The most
common methods of analysis in the past have been classical
ML algorithms such as SVMs and NBCs, however, recently,
the focus has shifted to the use of ANNs. For instance, a team
of researchers was able to obtain around an 80% accuracy
for the binary classification of the NSL-KDD dataset with an
ANN. This result is approximately the same as the result we
obtained using an ANN [4].
In regard to comparing the quality of both datasets, another
group analyzed ensemble ML model’s ability to classify IoT
intrusion attacks in both of these datasets. They found that
in general, the classifiers trained on the KDDCup99 dataset
obtained a higher accuracy than those trained on the NSL-
KDD dataset. However, this team utilized feature selection
when preprocessing their data, which demonstrates why they
were able to obtain characteristically higher accuracies of
99.42% and 98.70% on the KDDCup99 and NSL-KDD
datasets respectively for the binary classification task [5].
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Finally, one of the most relevant research studies to the
contents of this paper was conducted by the original creators
of the NSL-KDD dataset. This team constructed the NSL-
KDD dataset as a means of improving the KDDCup99 dataset.
Namely, they removed redundant and repetitive records from
the KDDCup99 dataset in hopes of improving its quality. This
group also tested numerous ML algorithms on their newly
created NSL-KDD dataset and observed lower accuracies on
it in comparison to the KDDCup99 dataset for the binary
classification task. They attributed this lower accuracy to the
increased rigor of the NSL-KDD dataset as represented by the
removal of "easy-to-classify" records [6].
III. System Model
Figure 1 shows the system model for this study starting from
the dataset and ending with the evaluation of the various ML
classifiers.
Fig. 1. Diagram of System Model
IV. Datasets
A. Overview
Both the KDDCup99 and NSL-KDD datasets contain five
main intrusion types or categories: Normal (No intrusion),
DoS, Probe, U2R, and R2L. These intrusion types are defined
below,
1) Normal: Networks that do not contain any intrusions.
2) DoS: Shutting down a network by flooding it with
information and requests.
3) R2L: Unauthorized access from a remote machine
4) U2R: Intruder attempts to gain access to a normal user
account
5) Probe: Surveillance intrusions on networks [9].
In addition, we will also consider the binary categorization
for this dataset (i.e. 0 representing when a network intrusion
does NOT occur and 1 representing when a network intru-
sion DOES occur). These two categorization types will be
referenced throughout the paper as "type categorization" and
"binary categorization," respectively.
1) KDDCup99: The KDDCup99 is the original IoT net-
work intrusion dataset that was created in 1999. The motiva-
tion behind the dataset’s creation was to improve the capability
of IDSs. Namely, with this dataset, cybersecurity researchers
could train algorithms to better identify when a network intru-
sion occurs based on quantitative and categorical data regard-
ing the state of the network itself. With respect to the training
and test datasets, we used the pre-sampled 10% subset of the
KDDCup99 training dataset ("kddcup.data_10_percent.gz") as
our experimental training dataset and the full KDDCup99
test dataset ("corrected.gz") as our experimental test dataset.
This choice was made in order to reduce the computational
power required to process and handle the full training dataset.
Henceforth, whenever we say "KDDCup99 training dataset",
we are referring to the 10% subset of the full KDDCup99
training dataset [9].
One of the most important aspects of this dataset is the im-
balanced class distribution. Notably, the extremely low number
of both R2L and U2R intrusion types present within it. Figure
2 and Table 1 display the class distribution within this dataset,
illustrating the relatively low number of R2L and U2R attack
types in comparison to the other three. Table 2 displays the
class distribution in the context of the binary categorization. It
is evident that the number of intruded networks far outnumbers
the number of normal networks.
TABLE I
Intrusion-Type Class Distribution in KDDCup99 Training Dataset
Normal DoS R2L U2R Probe
Frequency 97,278 391,458 1,126 52 4,107
Fig. 2. Intrusion-Type Class Distribution in KDDCup99 Training Dataset
TABLE II
Binary Class Distribution in KDDCup99 Training Dataset
Normal Intrusion
Frequency 97,278 396,743
2) NSL-KDD: The NSL-KDD dataset is the improved
version of the KDDCup99 dataset. In essence, researchers in
the University of New Brunswick Canadian Institute for Cyber-
security removed redundant records from the original KDD-
Cup99 dataset to create a more concise and efficient intrusion
detection dataset. Concerning the training and test datasets, we
used the full NSL-KDD training ("KDDTrain+.TXT") and test
("KDDTest+.TXT") datasets as our experimental training and
test datasets. We were able to do this because the NSL-KDD
dataset is much smaller in comparison to the full KDDCup99
dataset [10].
Although there is still a class imbalance between intrusion
types, namely, the low number of U2R and R2L intrusions,
the fact that there are far fewer instances of the other three
intrusion types mitigates the effect of this class imbalance in
comparison to the KDDCup99 training dataset. Figure 3 and
Table 3 illustrate this. Moreover, Table 4 displays the class
distribution in the context of the binary categorization. It is
important to note that there is a much greater class balance
between normal and intruded networks in comparison to the
KDDCup99 training dataset.
TABLE III
Intrusion-Type Class Distribution in NSL-KDD Training Dataset
Normal DoS R2L U2R Probe
Frequency 67,343 45,927 995 52 11,656
Fig. 3. Intrusion-Type Class Distribution in NSL-KDD Training Dataset
TABLE IV
Binary Class Distribution in NSL-KDD Training Dataset
Normal Intrusion
Frequency 67,343 58,630
B. Preprocessing
Because both datasets contained categorical features, we
one-hot encoded all of these categorical columns so that the
ML algorithms could "understand" the data.
The train and test datasets for both the KDDCup99 and
NSL-KDD datasets were normalized to values between 0
and 1 by the L2 or Euclidian normalization. When the L2
normalization is applied on vector ®x, such that ®y = ®x‖ ®x ‖ , the
sum of the squares of the components of ®y (the normalized
vector) equals 1. The L2 normalization was used instead of
the L1 normalization because it has been demonstrated that
the former has many advantages that improve the performance
of ML classifiers.
V. Machine Learning Methods
This section describes the theory and implementation of the
four ML algorithms that we used in this study: the Naïve Bayes
Classifier (NBC), Support Vector Machines (SVMs), Random
Forests, and Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs). As a note,
all of the ML classifiers were trained on normalized data.
A. Naïve Bayes Classifier
1) Overview: The NBC is a probabilistic classifier that
utilizes the Bayes theorem. Its naivety comes from the rather
strong assumptions of independence among the features in
a particular dataset. Bayes theorem can be expressed as the
following mathematical relationship:
P(Ck | ®x) = P(®x |Ck)P(Ck)P(®x) , (1)
where ®x = (x1, x2, ... , xn) is a data point consisting of n
independent features, Ck represents class k, and P(Ck | ®x) is the
probability that data point ®x belongs to class Ck . The NBC
algorithm applies Bayes theorem across all of the features
within the dataset. In this manner, the class yˆ that data point
®x belongs to (as predicted by the NBC) can be expressed as
yˆ = argmax
k∈{1,...,K }
P(Ck)
n∏
i=1
P(xi |Ck). (2)
Because some of the features within both datasets were contin-
uous values, we used the Gaussian NBC which simply assumes
that these continuous features are distributed according to the
Gaussian distribution. Additionally, for the multi-class portion
of this classification task, we used the Multinomial NBC.
Going into this study, the NBC served as our standard of
comparison as it is known to be less accurate than the other
three classifiers used in this study [1].
2) Implementation: As previously mentioned the Gaussian
NBC was used for both the binary and type classification tasks.
Additionally, for the type classification task, the Multinomial
variant of the Gaussian NBC was used.
B. Support Vector Machines
1) Overview: SVMs are ML algorithms that attempt to use
hyperplane-based vectors in order to separate the data‘s labels
with maximal margin. With this hyperplane separation, the
SVM is then able to "understand" the spatial location of the
classes within the dataset [8].
2) Implementation: Because SVMs are traditionally used
for binary classifications, we only used the SVM in order
to classify whether or not a particular network contained an
intrusion. This means we did not use the SVM to classify the
intrusion type. This is reflected in the results section.
SVMs are known to be computationally expensive. As a
result, we only used a 0.05% random sample of both the
KDDCup99 and NSL-KDD training datasets to train our SVM.
Furthermore, we utilized the linear kernel for our SVM.
C. Random Forest
1) Overview: Random Forests or random decision trees
function by creating numerous "mini" decision trees or esti-
mators and repeatedly training these estimators on a particular
dataset. The Random Forest evaluates output by essentially
taking the majority vote of these estimators. More formally,
classification occurs by taking the average (or the majority
vote) of the estimators for a given input sample x ′ as repre-
sented by the mathematical function:
fˆ =
1
B
B∑
b=1
fb(x‘) (3)
Here, fˆ represents the class that sample x‘ belongs to
(as predicted by the Random Forest), B is the number of
estimators, and fb is a function representing what class the
particular estimator b predicts sample x ′ to be in [7].
2) Implementation: We used 5 estimators in our implemen-
tation of the Random Forest algorithm. Furthermore, because
Random Forests are also computationally expensive, we only
trained it on a 0.1% random sample of both the KDDCup99
and NSL-KDD training datasets. The Random Forest algo-
rithm was adaptable to both the binary and type classification
tasks. Figures 4 and 5 show sample shallow estimators from
our KDDCup99 and NSL-KDD Random Forests, respectively.
Fig. 4. Random Forest Estimator - KDDCup99
D. Artificial Neural Network
1) Overview: ANNs mimic the processing techniques of the
human brain. They do this by passing "information" through
a series of weighted neuron layers (nodes) which are fine-
tuned until the ANN can successfully replicate the patterns
and relationships within datasets’ features and labels. This is
similar to how our brain gradually adjusts neural connections
to learn new skills.
Fig. 5. Random Forest Estimator - NSL-KDD
Looking at the mathematical nature of a single node, this
connectivity is clear. If there are four nodes each contain-
ing the input scalars x1, x2, x3, x4, respectively, that all pass
information into one node, there will be four connections.
Each of these connections will have a particular "weight",
w1,w2,w3,w4, respectively. To replicate the human brain, the
one neuron that is receiving the information from the other
four has to scale each of the inputs (xi’s) by the weight of
their connection. Then, the ANN sums all of these weighted
inputs adds a scalar bias and applies an activation function
which helps introduce non-linearity to the model. In all, this
can be represented mathematically as:
Neuron Output = f (b +
∑
i
wi xi). (4)
Here, f is the activation function (sigmoid, ReLU, etc.) and b
is the scalar bias.
2) Implementation: The topology of our ANN consisted
of two hidden layers of size 100 nodes and one output layer
of size 5 or 1 nodes depending on whether the classification
was type or binary, respectively. Figures 6 and 7 depict the
topology of the binary and type classification ANN, respec-
tively. Both hidden layers were activated by the ReLU function
defined as,
ReLU(x) = max(0, x), (5)
The 1 node output layer was activated by the sigmoid function
defined as,
sigmoid(x) = 1
1 + e−x
, (6)
and finally, the 5 node output layer was activated by the
softmax function defined as,
SoftMax(z)i = e
zi∑N
j=1 e
z j
for i = 1, ..., N
and z = (zi, ..., zN ) ∈ RN .
(7)
This function can take a vector z of dimension N with real
values and normalize that vector such that the sum of its
components is 1. After normalization, the components of z
are probabilities representing the extent to which the classifier
believes a particular data point belongs to each class [11].
Fig. 6. Binary Classification ANN Topology
Fig. 7. Type Classification ANN Topology
Two primary training specifications were present in the
ANN’s we used in this study: validation-loss based patience
and model checkpoints. Validation-loss based patience refers
to how many epochs we let our ANN train for. Specifically,
we allowed our ANN to keep training until the validation-loss
did not decrease for a chosen number of epochs, in our case,
we chose this number to be 20 (patience = 20). The model
checkpoints specification allowed us to save the best model
from the ANN’s entire training time based on the validation-
loss. To clarify, consider an ANN that trained for 200 epochs,
if the validation-loss was the best at epoch 58, the ANN from
epoch 58 would be saved and used for the results.
The Adam Optimizer was chosen here as it has been proven
to work for a vast majority of ML classification tasks [3].
Additionally, we employed the Categorical Cross Entropy
(CCE) loss function defined below:
CCE Loss = −
M∑
c=1
yo,c log(po,c). (8)
Here, M is the number of different classes, y is the binary
indicator (0 or 1) that the class label c is correct for observation
o, and p is the probability, calculated by the classifier, that
observation o belongs to class c [2]. Figures 8 and 9 depict
sample training/testing accuracy and loss curves in the training
procedure for both the KDDCup99 and NSL-KDD dataset-
based classifiers during the binary classification task. It is
important to note that the KDDCup99-ANN’s validation loss
function decreases over an interval while the NSL-KDD-
ANN’s validation loss function is nearly always increasing.
These graphs are cut off at 20 epochs.
Fig. 8. Traning/Testing Loss & Accuracy Curve - KDDCup99
Fig. 9. Traning/Testing Loss & Accuracy Curve - NSL-KDD
VI. Results
A. Evaluation Criteria
Two separate trials were conducted to evaluate the perfor-
mance of the ML classifiers. Firstly, we had to evaluate their
performance in the type classification task. To do this we
utilized an overall testing accuracy (the classifiers’ accuracy
on the testing portions of the KDDCup99 and NSL-KDD
datasets) which is displayed in tables 5 and 6. This was done
because generally, classification metrics such as precision,
recall, and f1-scores are used to evaluate binary classification
tasks. To complement these tables, we also displayed ANN’s
results in confusion matrices (Figures 10 and 11). Secondly,
we had to evaluate the ML classifiers’ performance in the bi-
nary classification task. To do this, we used the aforementioned
classification metrics: precision, recall, and f1-scores. These
results are displayed in tables 7 and 8. Each of these metrics
is based upon the number of predicted false positives, false
negatives, true positives, and true negatives defined as follows,
1) False positive (FP): A sample that is predicted as
positive but is actually negative;
2) False negative (FN): A sample that is predicted as
negative but is actually positive;
3) True positive (TP): A sample that is predicted as positive
and is actually positive;
4) True negative (TN): A sample that is predicted as
negative and is actually negative.
Here positive refers to a network that contains an intrusion
while negative refers to a network that does not. Then we can
define the classification metrics as,
Precision (P) = TP
TP + FP
(9)
Recall (R) = TP
TP + FN
(10)
F1-Score = 2 · P · R
P + R
. (11)
Because the training and testing datasets for both the KDD-
Cup99 and NSL-KDD datasets were separated by the creators,
a cross-validation was unnecessary.
B. Tabular Results
TABLE V
Type Classification Accuracies for KDDCup99
ANN SVM NBC Random Forest Average
Accuracy 92.39% 89.94% 92.21% 91.51%
TABLE VI
Type Classification Accuraies for NSL-KDD
ANN SVM NBC Random Forest Average
Accuracy 78.51% 61.08% 74.41% 71.33%
TABLE VII
Binary Classification Metrics for KDDCup99
ANN SVM NBC Random Forest Average
Precision 0.9985 0.9833 0.9937 0.9987 0.9936
Recall 0.9112 0.9339 0.8537 0.9084 0.9018
F1-Score 0.9529 0.9579 0.9185 0.9514 0.9452
Fig. 10. Confusion Matrix for ANN (Type Classification) - KDDCup99
Fig. 11. Confusion Matrix for ANN (Type Classification) - NSL-KDD
TABLE VIII
Binary Classification Metrics for NSL-KDD
ANN SVM NBC Random Forest Average
Precision 0.9661 0.8839 0.9672 0.9683 0.9464
Recall 0.6205 0.8142 0.1746 0.6158 0.5563
F1-Score 0.7557 0.8476 0.2957 0.7528 0.6630
VII. Discussion
A. Type Classification Accuracies
With respect to the type classification testing accuracies
(displayed in Tables 5 and 6), it is clear that the ANNs
performed the best across both datasets. This was expected
as ANNs have been shown to have a better ability to detect
patterns within datasets in comparison to the other ML algo-
rithms used in this study (NBCs, SVMs, and Random Forests).
More surprising however, is the difference in type classification
accuracy across the classifiers trained by the KDDCup99 and
NSL-KDD datasets. On average, the classifiers trained on
the KDDCup99 dataset displayed a 20.18% greater accuracy
than those trained on the NSL-KDD dataset. This accuracy
difference can be attributed to the fact that the KDDCup99
contains many redundant records which are extremely easy
for classifiers to identify.
B. U2R and R2L Identification
Figures 10 and 11 display the confusion matrices for the
ANN’s classification results. One unusual aspect about these
confusion matrices is the difference in the classification accu-
racy for R2L and U2R attacks. Specifically, the ANN trained
on the KDDCup99 dataset correctly predicted 2.5% of R2L
and 13% of U2R attacks while the ANN trained on the NSL-
KDD dataset only predicted 0.73% of R2L and 0% of U2R
attacks. This result goes against one of the primary intentions
of the creation of the NSL-KDD dataset. Namely, the increased
class balance in the NSL-KDD dataset should have made
detecting these infrequent intrusion types easier, however, our
results show that it might, in fact, be more difficult. This
suggests that some of the records that were removed from the
KDDCup99 dataset to create the NSL-KDD dataset may have
been essential to properly distinguishing U2R and R2L attacks
from the three other intrusion types. Notably, the ANN trained
on the NSL-KDD dataset primarily classified R2L and U2R
attacks as Normal networks. This shows that there may be
underlying problems in the NSL-KDD dataset that is causing
this seemingly irrational judgement.
C. Binary Classification Accuracies
The binary classification task sought to identify whether a
particular network state was normal or was representative of an
intrusion attack. Surprisingly, across both the KDDCup99 and
NSL-KDD dataset-trained classifiers the SVMs performed the
best with f1-scores of 0.9579 and 0.8476, respectively. This
result was surprising because SVMs are not as sophisticated
as Random Forests or ANNs. Looking specifically at precision
and recall values, it is evident that the Random Forests had
the best precision values while the SVMs had the best recall
values. The ANNs and Random Forests did not perform the
best in any of the three categories (precision, recall, or f1-
score).
More generally, the classifiers trained on the NSL-KDD
dataset had an average f1-score of 0.6630 while the classifiers
trained on the KDDCup99 dataset had a much higher average
f1-score of 0.9452. A deeper look at this difference reveals
that the primary setback for the NSL-KDD-trained classifiers
were their low recall values. Namely, the average KDDCup99
classifier recall value was 0.9018 while the average NSL-KDD
classifier recall value was much lower at 0.5563. This means
that the NSL-KDD classifiers tended to predict many more
false negatives. Overall, however, the fact that the NSL-KDD
classifiers had a lower performance indicates that the NSL-
KDD dataset contains a much more rigorous set of data, which
is essential to the strengthening of IDSs.
Fig. 12. PCA Visualization of KDDCup99 Dataset
Fig. 13. PCA Visualization of NSL-KDD Dataset
D. Principle Component Analysis
Figures 12 and 13 display the Principle Component Analysis
plots of a random 0.4% subset of the KDDCup99 dataset and
a random 1% subset of the NSL-KDD dataset, respectively.
The Principle Component Analysis allowed us to reduce the
dimensionality of the datasets so that they could be visualized
on graphs. We observed that the KDDCup99 dataset contained
a greater degree of separation between the different intrusion
types while the NSL-KDD dataset contained much more
overlap. This is consistent with our results as data that has
a higher degree of separation between classes is easier to
classify. However, this increased spatial separation present in
the KDDCup99 dataset is probably indicative of redundant
records that are geometrically "overlapping".
VIII. Conclusions & Future Research
The quality of the NSL-KDD dataset is significantly higher
than that of the KDDCup99 dataset. This conclusion is based
off the metrics used to evaluate the performance of the various
ML classifiers.
1) Type classification accuracies: The respective test-
ing type classification accuracies of the ML classifiers
trained on the NSL-KDD dataset were much lower
than the classifiers trained on the KDDCup99 dataset.
This demonstrates how the redundant records in the
KDDCup99 dataset enables algorithms to perform with
a higher accuracy.
2) Binary classification metrics (Precision, Recall, and
F1-scores): It was observed that the average f1-score for
the ML classifiers trained on the KDDCup99 dataset,
0.9452, was much higher than the F1-score for the ML
classifiers trained on the NSL-KDD dataset, 0.6630.
This further indicates that the ML classifiers perform
better on the KDDCup99 dataset due to the redundant
and "easy-to-classify" records within it.
One interesting aspect of our results was the relatively low
classification accuracy of the R2L and U2R intrusion types
by the classifiers trained on the NSL-KDD dataset. Typically,
researchers have found that the NSL-KDD dataset allows for
a higher classification accuracy for these intrusion types due
to the decreased class imbalance, however, our results showed
the opposite. This is likely due to differences in data sampling
or classifier topology/architecture.
In the future, our team plans to develop "stacked" or
ensemble ML classifiers that are specifically geared towards
having a higher accuracy on the NSL-KDD dataset as it is
of a significantly higher quality than the KDDCup99 dataset.
Specifically, we hope to improve the characteristically low
recall values our classifiers obtained on the NSL-KDD dataset
which means being able to mitigate the number of false
negatives. Finally, we hope to expand our comparative analysis
to a wider set of ML classification algorithms for greater
completeness.
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